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The ability to conduct offensive military operations
is dependent upon the length of time required to transport
war materiel to combatant units. Effective tactical air
interdiction of a transportation network by opposing forces
should maximize this time. When constrained by a limited
number of available aircraft for interdiction, a strike
planner needs to be able to determine the primary route of
traffic flow, and to decide which targets to attack along
this route. A solution procedure is developed in this paper
for determining the optimal points of interdiction so as to
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(i,j) - an undirected arc connecting nodes i and j
d. . - transit time for arc (i,i")
N - total number of nodes in the system
r..(t) - remaining repair time for arc (i,j) at time t
d..(r) - transit time of arc (i,j) once it has been re-
•' paired
c.(t) - remaining time to construct a bypass for arc
^ (i>j) at time t
d..(c) - transit time over a newly constructed bypass of
13 arc (i,j)
d..(t) - transit time for interdicted arc (i,j) which is
* dependent upon departure time from node i
t
a
- clocktime when an attack is completed (the
earliest time that repair efforts can commence)
- earliest clocktime after attack that a vehicle





In conventional or limited warfare the success or fail-
ure of a military campaign is directly dependent upon logis-
tical support. Estimates of war materiels necessary to
conduct combat operations have varied from 60 pounds per day
per man, as for United States forces in Korea, to as low as
two to three pounds per man per day for hit-and-run guerrilla
forces [1] . This materiel must be transported through a
given logistical network to combatant units if the enemy is
to sustain any degree of offensive operations. The applica-
tion of tactical air interdiction can be an effective method
of denying the enemy these vital war supplies.
Tactical air interdiction can be defined as the imple-
mentation of strike aircraft against an enemy's lines-of-
communication so as to impede the flow of war materiel to
combatant forces. Three basic options are available in
tactical air interdiction: (1) attack the sources of sup-
ply to disrupt dissemination of goods and to physically
destroy a portion of an enemy's war potential; (2) attack
the transportation network, i.e., the highway and railroad
system, in an attempt to impede the flow of supplies; or
(3) attack the enemy's various modes of transportation,
i.e., trucks, trains, and waterborne craft, to deny him the
vehicular means to transport cargo.
Current literature in the field of network theory con-
tains several different models for interdicting a transportatioi
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system. Wollmer [12, 13] has developed an algorithm to de-
termine the n most vital links in a network of capacitated
arcs. His basic assumption in development of the algorithm
was that the capacity of a given arc can be reduced to zero.
In a more recent paper, Wollmer [14] presented two algoritlims
for targeting strikes in a lines-of -communication (LOC) net-
work. He assumed that the user of the LOC ' s was attempting
to achieve a circulation flow at minimum cost, a general goal
that included, as special cases, maximizing flow between two
points, meeting required flow between two points at minimum
cost, and combinations of these two. The algorithms devel-
oped attempted to make such costs as large as possible over
time when the desired effect of targeting strikes was to in-
crease arc-cost functions and decrease arc capacities for a
given time interval. The first algorithm considered arc
costs as linear functions of flow; the second considered arc
costs as piecewise linear functions of flow with one break
point. Durbin [3] developed a computer program for sequen-
tial selection and destruction of the most vital arcs until
network flow had been stopped or until a pre-designated
number of arcs had been destroyed. The network incorporated
maximum cargo flow as a function of the number of cargo-car-
rying vehicles made available to the system. Mustin [11]
devised a scheme for allocation of strike aircraft against
a transportation system where the network is capacity-lim-
ited. This method was dependent upon estimates of upper and
lower bounds on arc capacities, and upon the estimated number
of sorties required to effect a unit reduction in capacity.

Most present literature involving tactical interdic-
tion is concerned with reduction of enemy supply capacities
or with maximization of the enemy's cost to transport war
materiel. This paper will take a different approach; de-
velopment of a method to maximize the time required for an
enemy to deliver war materiel to his front line troops.
Maximizing the time required for an enemy to transport
cargo is a tactically sound concept. There must exist a
given inventory of supplies plus a given rate of re-supply
for an enemy to conduct offensive operations. From a simple
standpoint, take the example of a two- and-one-half- ton truck.
Being capacity limited, this truck can carry a certain amount
of cargo to a given point in some unit time. Any increase
in this delivery time reduces the number of tons per unit
time or, in essence, denies the enemy cargo-carrying time.
Over any given interval, and magnified over many such vehi-
cles, the enemy has suffered a substantial loss in logistical
support.
Such increases in delivery time have several more far-
reaching effects. With deliveries arriving at short time
intervals, the problem of forecasting future supply require-
ments is relatively easy. As delivery time intervals in-
crease, the enemy should experience greater difficulty in
logistical forecasting, thus hampering his ability to plan
future offensive campaigns. Furthermore, the enemy no
longer has the logistical stability to react as effectively
to tactical changes in a campaign. In essence, an enemy's





A strike planner is confronted with the task of de-
ciding which targets to strike on a given day. Assuming
that his objective is to interdict an enemy's lines-of-
communication , he should have a procedure which systemat-
ically selects optimal points of interdiction so as to
maximize the time required to traverse a given transporta-
tion network. With such a procedure the planner could de-
termine the route of fastest travel, if he knew the transit
times of each segment of the network. If, in addition, the
planner also knew repair and bypass construction times after
a successful attack, he would then be able to evaluate any
delay or increased transit time per segment along a given
route.
With unlimited aircraft and facilities, the problem
would be trivial, as the planner would simply keep all seg-
ments of the network under constant attack. However, when
he is constrained by a limited number of aircraft and fa-
cilities, it becomes imperative that the strike planner be
able to derive the optimal points of interdiction so as to
maximize the time required for an enemy to supply his forces

II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
This paper will propose a solution technique to the
tactical air interdiction problem which will dynamically
determine the optimal points of attack along a transporta-
tion network so as to maximize the time required for an
enemy to transport war materiel to his front line troops.
A basic assumption to the solution procedure is that
repair or bypass construction are known functions of time.
The procedure is also predicated upon the assumption that
any attack is considered completely successful, i.e., the
target is destroyed. Capacities, costs, and aircraft vul-
nerability will be indirectly included in the model.
The basic inputs to the model will be the transportation
network, time to travel over each road segment, designated
points of interdiction, repair and bypass construction time
for each designated point of interdiction, and the new travel
times associated with the repair and bypass construction.
Outputs of the system will be the path of primary traffic
flow, the road segments to be attacked, and the increased




The model will utilize a highway transportation system
which is represented by a network of numbered nodes and as-
sociated arcs. Each arc indicates a segment of road with
uniform characteristics as to highway conditions or sur-
rounding topography. A node separates arcs of different
characteristics
.
The network is assumed to have a single source, node 1,
and a single sink, node n. Each arc is represented by two
integers (i,j) which correspond to the numbers of the nodes
which the arc connects.
There exists a transit time, d.., for each arc based
lj
upon road conditions, terrain, and time of day. Several
other inherent factors in a highway transportation system
also have an effect upon the transit times of vehicular traf
fie, but for problem simplification will be considered as
constants. Examples of such factors are:
(1) Amount and type of cargo to be carried.
(2) Average payload per vehicle type.
(3) Vehicle availability.
(4) Loading and unloading times.
(5) Rate of travel of various vehicles.
(6) Daily operating times and maintenance schedules.
(7) Convoy characteristics.
(8) Other military and non-military traffic.
Transit times associated with night operations are ap-
proximately the same constant of proportionality slower for
11

all road conditions and terrains than the comparable daytime
values. This constant of proportionality is approximately
0.4 [10]. Therefore, when night values are required, they
can be incorporated into the model as 0.4d...
In addition to the assigned transit times (d..'s), each
arc will have attributes of repair time and/or time to con-
struct a bypass in the event that any segment is destroyed
by an airstrike. Repair and bypass construction times will
be dependent upon manpower availability , resource require-
ments, and resource availability. Let
r..(t) = time remaining to repair arc (i,j) at time t,
d..(r) = transit time over arc (i,j) once it has been
•* repaired,
c.(t) - time remaining to construct a bypass for arc
1
-
J (i>j) a "t time t, and
d..(c) = transit time over a newly constructed bypass
1 of arc (i
, j )
.
Repair and bypass construction times are assumed known
and further assumed to be decreasing linear functions of time
with a slope of (-1). The values of d.
.
(r) and d..(c) are
assumed to be greater than or equal to the uninterdicted
transit times, d... This is a reasonable assumption since
bypass construction is usually inferior to the original road
segment, thus slowing traffic. Furthermore, even with a seg-
ment fully repaired, a vehicle may have a tendency to travel
at a slower pace in an area that has recently undergone a
bombing attack.
Immediately following interdiction of a road segment,
the arc transit time value becomes a function of repair or
12

bypass construction time. Therefore, after interdiction,





. (r) , c. . (t) + d. . (c) ] (3.1)
where t represents the earliest clocktime after attack that
a vehicle can depart from the source and arrive at the point
of interdiction. The function which is minimum is assumed
to be the approach the enemy will use to get the arc back
into operation; i.e., if r..(t) + d..(r) < c.ftj + d..(c),
then the enemy will repair the road segment. Conversely,
if c. . ft) + d. . (c) < r . . (t) + d. . fr) , then the enemy willij 13 13 ij
choose to construct a bypass around the interdicted point.
If t represents the clocktime when an attack is com-
a r
pleted, then the equations for repair and bypass construc-
tion become:
if t + c
.
(t ) < t
a ij v a J
Although any segment of a road is subject to attack, a
highway segment that can be attacked by strike aircraft and
then be extremely difficult to repair or bypass is called a
"choke point." In other words, choke points are segments
in a network which once attacked force an enemy to either
reroute traffic or expend large amounts of resources to keep
the attacked segment open to traffic. Examples of "good"
13

choke points would be bridges, mountain roads, and inter-
sections not easily bypassed. Choke points are therefore
logical points for interdiction. To determine the relative
merit of choke points one estimates how much time would be
required to repair or bypass a successfully attacked road
segment with a given amount of manpower and equipment. The
greater the enemy resource requirements, the better the rel
ative merit of the choke point.
One further assumption to the model is that all air-
strikes against points of interdiction will occur during
daylight hours. Night air operations against point targets
have an extremely low kill probability and will therefore
be excluded from the model.
14

IV . SOLUTION PROCEDURE
A. ALGORITHM PREVIEW
The solution procedure to be developed will determine
the optimal points of interdiction along a given highway-
transportation system so as to maximize the time required to
traverse the network. The network is initially solved for
the fastest route from source to sink under conditions of
no interdiction by application of Dijkstra's algorithm [2].
This fastest route is assumed to be the primary route of
vehicular travel. Along this route of fastest travel an arc
is selected for interdiction. This is accomplished by com-
paring the repair and construction bypass functions for each
segment along the route. The minimum value of these func-
tions for each segment is calculated and then the segment
with the maximum value will be the point of initial inter-
diction. The interdicted arc is then replaced with this time
dependent function. To determine the next fastest route,
apply the time-dependence concepts proposed by Dreyfus in his
extension of the Dijkstra algorithm [2]. Along this route
the next point of interdiction is selected as previously
stated. The procedure is continued using the concepts of
time-dependence
.
The algorithm is open-ended, i.e., there is no defini-
tive point of termination for the procedure. Conceivably,
attacks could be terminated, and through enemy repair ef-
forts the network would return to its structure prior to
interdiction. Therefore, termination of the solution technique
15

is determined by the operational doctrine of some higher
authority.
B. TIME -MAXIMIZATION ALGORITHM
1. Initially the network is solved for the fastest
route which a vehicle could traverse from source to sink
under conditions of no interdiction. Assign travel times
for each arc (d..'s) and apply Dijkstra's algorithm to de-
termine the route of fastest travel.
(a) Label the source (node 1) with a permanent value
of zero (denoted by 0*j and place a tentative label of in-
finity on all other nodes.
v CO) . p v (o) . „„
1 2 . . .n
(b) For each node except node 1, compare the sum of
the label of node 1, i.e., V, = , and the time value (d..)
from node 1 to the node in question with the current label
on the node. The minimum value of these two numbers is the
new tentative label, i.e.,
V. (1) = min(V 1 (0) + d. ,, «) .
J 1 iJ
(c) Determine the smallest of the N - 1 tentative
labels and declare it permanent.
V, P = min V.k m J
(d) Let node k be the one permanently labeled at the
end of step (c) . Then compare the tentative labels on the
remaining N - 2 nodes with the sum of V\P + d, . . The smaller
16

of these two numbers is assigned as the new tentative la-
bel.
Vj C2) = min(Vk
P + d
kj , V.^h
(e) Determine the minimum of these N - 2 tentative
labels, assign a permanent value to it, and make it the
basis for further iterations. The general iterative step
for determining the remaining labels is:
xt (m ) • nr P a \r (m ~l)>, xr P u (m)V. J = mm (v\ r + d, . , V . ' ) ; V, v = mm V . J
3 K KJ J K ^k J
(f) Continue the iterative process implied by steps
(d) and (e) . Terminate when node n is permanently labeled.
At most N - 1 iterations will be required. The optimal
paths can now easily be reconstructed if the node from which
each permanently labeled node was labeled was recorded. The
optimal path may also be determined from the final node la-
bels by ascertaining which nodes have labels that differ by
exactly the length (d..) of a connecting arc. A fastest
route from node 1 to node n will have all arcs (i,j) satis-
fying V. p - V. p = d. .
.
2. Along the route of fastest travel, an arc, usually
designated as a choke point, must be selected as an initial
point of interdiction. To select the point of initial at-
tack proceed as follows:
(a) For each arc (i,j) compare the attributes of re-
pair and bypass construction times and decide whether the
enemy will repair the road or construct a bypass by applying
17

equation (3.1) with t = V. . Record the resulting d..(t)
value for each arc.
(b) Choose the maximum of these recorded values to








where t = V. .
1






(t) + d. .(r)
,
(4.2)
13 lj ij v J
if step 2(a) indicates repair is optimal; otherwise,
d. . (t) = c. .(I;) + d. . (c) . (4.3)
13 13 13
The problem is now time-dependent in nature and the route
of next fastest travel is determined by applying concepts
developed by Dreyfus in his extension of the Dijkstra algo-
rithm.
(a) Define the new tentative node label W. to be anv
' 1
upper bound on the earliest time of arrival at node 1, and
permanent labels, W.
,
to be the earliest possible (optimal)
times -of- arrival
.
(b) Permanently label node 1 (source) with a value of
W. = and label all other nodes with values of infinity;
i.e.,




(c) Tentatively label all nodes j f with the minimum
of the current node label W. and the sum of W, and d..(t); i.e.,
18

W. (1) = min[W
n
+ d..(W.. p ), W.^ 0) l.
J
L 1 ir 1 -" 3 J
(d) Find the minimum tentative node label, i.e., W,
,
and declare it permanent.
W, p = min W.^ 1 ^
k jtl J
(e) Node k, the new permanent node, is then used to
attempt to reduce the labels at all tentatively labeled
nodes by comparing W, p + d,
.
(t) to the current label. The
minimum new temporary label is declared permanent and used
as a basis for the next iterations; i.e.,







(f) Terminate when node n is permanently labeled.
4. The new fastest route has now been determined. Re
pair and bypass functions of all segments along this route
are examined and the next interdiction point is determined
by application of equations (3.1) and (4.1) with t = W. p .
To determine each successive fastest route and associated
points of interdiction, return to step 3.
If a tie exists for the next fastest route proceed as
follows
:
(i) With one route having a designated interdiction
point under a form of repair and the other route having a
designated interdiction point not under repair, select the
route with the segment not under repair.
19

(ii) If both routes have interdiction points under a
form of repair, then select the route with the segment having
undergone the greatest amount of repair.
(iii) If both routes have interdiction points with
identical repair attributes, then either route may be se-
lected.
There exists no additional penalty to the enemy for
interdiction of a segment undergoing repair. The repair
and bypass construction times simply revert to those com-
mensurate with the time of latest attack.
Use of nighttime values does not alter the procedure
for selecting the next fastest route, since all such values
are proportionally smaller than their respective daytime
values
.
5. The algorithm is open-ended, i.e., there is no
definitive point of termination. Termination would most





Consider the simplified uninterdicted highway network
described by Figure 1. All transit times (d..) are in
hours, and nodes 1 and 6 will be the source and sink nodes
respectively.
12
Figure 1. An Example Network.
Initially apply Dijkstra's algorithm to determine the
route of fastest travel. The network solution is indicated
by Figure 2.
V 2 =lp V„=3P
Vi=Op (l V 6 =1QP
V 3 = 3P V 5 = 7p
Figure 2. Dijkstra's Algorithm at Termination.
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Examination of Figure 2 reveals that the route of
fastest travel is (1,3,5,6) with a total transit time of 10
hours. The repair and bypass construction functions of this
route should now be examined and equation (4.1) used to de-
termine the arc of initial interdiction. For simplicity,
suppose that arc (3,5) had been selected as the first arc to
interdict and its attributes were:








.(t ) = 8 hours (bypass construction time immediately
"3b a
after attack) , and
d_
c
.(c) = 7 hours (new transit time once bypass con-
structed) .
Given these values, equation (3.1) with t = V^ indi-
cates use of the time function associated with bypass con-
struction for arc (3,5). Now apply the time-dependence
portion of the algorithm to determine the next fastest route.
However, since the problem is now a dynamic one, the solu-
tion for subsequent fastest routes depends upon the actual
time of solution. A solution for a vehicle departing node
1 at the time of initial attack is indicated by Figure 3.
The route of fastest travel is now (1,2,4,6) with a
total transit time of 15 hours. Examination of repair and
bypass construction functions along this route will deter-
mine the next point of interdiction. However, if vehicular
traffic delayed departure from node 1 for six hours or more,
the primary route of travel would revert back to (1,3,5,6),
22






w 3 = 3
p W 5 =13P
W G =15P
Figure 3. Time-Dependence Algorithm at Termination for
Vehicles Departing Node 1 at Time of Attack.
since the bypass would either be in the final stages of con-
struction or completed. This bypass construction would then
result in a time value, d,t-(t), of a maximum of nine hours
for a departure of six hours, to a minimum of seven hours
upon bypass completion (see Figure 4) . Total network tran-
sit time would now vary from a maximum of 15 hours immedi-








Subsequent iterations of the solution technique may
continue for some predetermined length of time utilizing






To determine the fastest route from node 1 to node n
2
when utilizing the concepts of time-dependence, at most N
2
comparisons and N /2 additions are required for node n to
be permanently labeled.
The solution procedure could conceivably continue in-
definitely as the time delays to the enemy's logistical ef-
fort approaches some large number. Tactical or operational
doctrine would be the limiting factors to the solution tech-
nique. An example of such doctrine would be a directive
from higher authority to conduct air interdiction operations
only during a particular climatic season.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
The assumption that repair times and bypass construc-
tion times are known functions is somewhat artificial. These
variables depend upon the enemy's resource availability, in-
cluding manpower, materials, and tools, and the operational
doctrine under which he assigns priority of missions. Orig-
inal estimates of these values can be based upon prior in-
terdiction experience, but such estimates may be of dubious
value to a strike planner. However, through aerial recon-
naissance and intelligence evaluation, these estimates
could be refined.
The assumption that the enemy will react to an inter-
diction strike by either constructing a bypass or by fully
25

repairing the attacked area, but not both, is felt to be
valid when an enemy is under threat of constant air attack,
Bypass construction usually takes less time than it would
to fully repair a target, yet the associated times of tran-
sit, once bypass construction is completed, are usually
greater than those transit times associated with repair.
Therefore, strictly from the viewpoint of desiring to mini-
mize transit time through a network, the enemy could con-
ceivably commence both repair and bypass construction
simultaneously. The curve of d..(t) would then have a
shape like that of Figure 5. However, the few possible
extra hours of network transit time eliminated is probably
not worth the huge expenditures of men and equipment re-










Figure 5. Repair [r..(t)] and Bypass Construction [c.(t)]
Functions for Arc (i,j) (shaded area indicates
minimum time required to transit arc (i,j) after
interdiction at time t )
C. APPLICATION
The solution technique presented in this paper and sub-
sequent extensions would seem applicable for use by a strike
planner for tactical air interdiction is a Southeast Asia
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type scenario. The calculated routes of fastest travel can
be verified by various airborne sensors, such as photography
and/or infra-red devices. Given this route of primary traf-
fic flow, the strike planner is confronted with the problem
of selecting interdiction points along this route. He must
rely solely upon the intelligence community for the estima-
ted values of repair and bypass construction times from
which he will base his selection of an interdiction point.
The allocation of necessary aircraft to conduct a strike
once a planner has solved for an interdiction point can be
accomplished by applying available tables [8,9] on sortie re-
quirements for a given target and a weapon system. More than
one interdiction point may be selected for a given attack
time depending upon aircraft availability. This can be ac-
complished by simply solving for as many fastest routes and
associated interdiction points as are compatible with the
target sortie rate requirements of the available aircraft.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
A major consideration in realistic application of the
model involves the fact that the enemy can often repair or
bypass bridges and road segments rapidly [4,5,7]. To demon-
strate this fact, it has been estimated that between 200,000
and 300,000 North Vietnamese were employed specifically for
this purpose during the United States interdiction campaign
against North Vietnam from 1965 to 1968 [6]. Therefore, to
effectively interdict an enemy's supply lines one must in-
corporate into the model methods to hinder or reduce the
27

enemy's capabilities to repair damaged target areas. Several
methods, or combinations thereof, can be employed for this
specific purpose: (1) attack a given target just prior to
nightfall since repair efforts take longer at night due to
reduced visibility; (2) fly armed reconnaissance missions,
with emphasis on night sorties, to harass enemy work crews
and attack targets of opportunity; (3) use delay action bombs
in the interdicted area to disrupt work crews in that area;
(4) seed the interdicted area and all its approaches with
aerial influence mines to keep vehicular traffic and work
crews from reaching the target area; and (5) develop more
accurate weapon systems, since the solution procedure is
predicated upon the basic assumption of successful attack.
These methods would require the additional refinement
to the model in the derivation of repair, bypass construc-
tion, and transit time functions. Careful evaluation of
intelligence data would be required to discover the effects
of such harrassment or mining techniques upon the enemy's
ability to repair a target area.
Another realistic refinement to the model would be to
omit the assumption of successful attack and to incorporate
time functions for variable levels of damage to a target
area. Estimates for computing these time functions would
most likely come from post-strike damage assessments and
aerial photography of the attacked area. Such functions
should be compatible with the solution technique developed
by this paper, although its complexity would be increased.
28

One consideration not incorporated into the model was
aircraft vulnerability. An approach that could possibly be
used would be to have the strike planner evaluate the pro-
posed target areas as to their respective anti-aircraft
defenses, assign a level of risk or estimate of aircraft
losses, and then make a decision whether the risk is com-
mensurate with the effects of the strike.
Successful implementation of the proposed solution
technique and its possible extensions should produce some
of the following results:
(1) Cause increases in the transit times of war ma-
teriel to combatants up to and including the point of com-
pletely stopping all traffic.
(2) Force the enemy to repair interdicted arcs during
the night, thus reducing the amount of road usage time when
aircraft are unable to effectively detect and attack vehic-
ular traffic.
(3) Cause the enemy to funnel his vehicular traffic
through certain routes at a higher level of congestion,
thus offering more lucrative targets for armed reconnais-
sance sorties.
(4) Force the enemy to divert huge amounts of manpower
and resources into a concentrated area to keep his lines-of-
communications open. This diversion of manpower and materials
would greatly reduce his overall effectiveness to wage war.
29

VI I . SUMMARY
A solution technique has been developed for determining
optimal geographical locations in a transportation network
for implementation of tactical air interdiction so as to
maximize the time required for an enemy to transport war
materiel to his combatant units. The method proposed is
dependent upon transit time, repair time, and bypass con-
struction time functions for each segment of the network.
Given transit times for each segment of a network, the
technique determines the route of fastest travel, assumed
to be the primary route for logistical traffic, by applica-
tion of Dijkstra's algorithm. Once this fastest route has
been determined, repair and bypass construction time func-
tions are analyzed for each segment along this route to
determine the point of initial interdiction. By comparing
the repair and bypass construction times summed with their
respective associated transit time values and then taking
the minimum value for each segment, the point to be inter-
dicted will be the maximum of these values.
With an interdiction point determined, the previous
transit time value for the interdicted arc is replaced with
this new value. The interdicted arc is now time-dependent
and the problem is dynamic in nature. Further iterations
to solve for subsequent fastest routes and points of inter-
diction utilize the time-dependence concepts proposed by
Dreyfus in his extension of the Dijkstra algorithm. The
30

methodology employed is similar to the computational pro-
cedure of the initial iteration. Termination of the solu-
tion technique is dependent upon the operational doctrine
imposed upon the user from some higher authority.
Inputs required for the solution technique are the
transportation network, transit times for each road segment,
repair and bypass construction time functions for each road
segment in the event of attack, and the new transit times
once repair and/or bypass construction is completed. Out-
puts of the system will be determination of the route of
fastest travel, selection of the optimal road segments to
be attacked, and the increased time required to traverse
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